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Policy Implications of the Common Ownership Debate
Eric A. Posner1
October 31, 2020
Abstract. The debate over common ownership initiated by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu’s
paper on airlines has raised questions about what, if any, policy responses are appropriate
when common owners reduce competition in product markets. This paper, a response to a
symposium for Antitrust Bulletin, reviews the literature on policy responses and evaluates
various reform proposals in light of recent empirical and theoretical developments.
Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu’s paper Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (AST)
launched an enormously important debate about capital markets.2 Like much path-breaking
work, it was initially derided, pooh-poohed, and even mocked. But whether or not the empirical
method used in that paper withstands the test of time, the questions it raises will. And with the
accumulation of evidence that common ownership effects do matter, and are likely harmful for
markets,3 the urgency of policy reform in the area of antitrust and capital markets regulation has
become inescapable. This symposium issue, which includes further empirical studies4 and a
helpful survey,5 offers an opportunity to reflect on policy implications.
AST is largely an empirical paper but the theoretical basis of their argument is
profoundly important. The history of antitrust law has a whack-a-mole-ish quality, familiar to
economists and lawyers as the call-and-response of regulatory arbitrage and legal reform.
Economic theory going back to Adam Smith tells us that firms can maximize profits by
colluding. The easiest form of collusion is price-fixing, which was duly outlawed. Block
price-fixing and firms can merge, acquire each other’s assets, or share directors. Block all this,
and the firms can sell themselves to a single third party, who will pay a high price for the shares
in order to obtain a monopoly. And if this is banned by law, each firm might sell some shares to
the third party (or to each other), so that the incentives to compete are softened. The third party
will pay a premium for shares owned by the shareholders of the firms, and it can buy up a large
enough stake in each firm so that it can use its influence over both firms to soften competition.
Because of the complex and obscure relationship between the size of a shareholder’s stake in a
firm and the degree of that shareholder’s control or influence over the firm, antitrust authorities
1
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may have trouble proving that a particular stake is large enough to create a risk of
anticompetitive outcomes. That difficulty creates opportunities for entities to obtain control
incrementally over competing firms and use that control to decrease competition, without
drawing antitrust scrutiny.
This logic is inescapable; the only question is the magnitude of the empirical effects.6
AST’s results may have provoked skepticism in some quarters because the largest common
owners of the airlines they studied were behemoth institutional investors, including BlackRock
and Vanguard, who had acquired substantial interests in the underlying firms through the
massive expansion of their index mutual funds. Index funds are supposed to be passive: index
funds cannot exert discipline over firms by threatening to sell shares, and they have always
trumpeted their passivity as a virtuous means for minimizing expenses. Indeed, the institutional
investors bragged about the puniness of their corporate governance offices. But while the
institutional investors play an outsized role, we should not forget that thousands of common
owners exist, most of them active, and AST raises questions about their behavior as well.
One group of criticisms of AST centered around the question of “mechanism”: what was
the mechanism with which institutional investors compelled portfolio firms to raise prices and
reduce output? The critics believed that the institutional investors made their money honestly—
by offering active funds that picked stocks or index funds that spared investors the trouble of
managing a diversified portfolio directly through stock or bond transactions—or were at least too
lazy, inhibited by institutional barriers, or risk-averse to compel portfolio firms to collude. Like
Great Britain, the common owners obtained their empires in a fit of absence of mind, as they met
the market demand for passive investing with increasingly cheap and efficient index funds and
index ETFs. And critics argued that index fund managers lacked an incentive to reduce
competition among the portfolio firms since the fund managers were not compensated with a
share of those firms’ profits. (The managers were, and are, compensated based on assets under
management, which would normally increase if profits of portfolio firms balloon as a result of
anticompetitive behavior and hence attract greater capital for those firms, but this form of
compensation may seem like a blunt instrument.)
Moreover, some researchers have found statistical or anecdotal evidence that common
ownership produces social benefits by internalizing positive externalities across firms, like those
that are due to research.7 These papers both strengthen AST’s major point that common
ownership affects the behavior of the portfolio firms, but cloud the normative implications of the
paper. If this recent work holds up, it is unclear whether common ownership should be
condemned for undermining market competition or celebrated for creating efficiencies.
Policymakers must therefore confront three questions. First, is the time ripe for
intervention or should they wait for more academic work to create a larger consensus among
independent academics about the empirical effects of common ownership? Second, if or when
policymakers should intervene, what is the appropriate regulatory response? Here, the question
6
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of the mechanism is important because the policy response—for example, antitrust litigation, as
opposed to some form of regulation—should normally be tailored to the mechanism. And third,
how should policymakers address common ownership if it both allows firms to internalize
externalities and reduces competition? In the remainder of this comment, I address these three
questions.
Intervene or Wait for More Research?
In arguing for legal intervention now, Elhauge trenchantly invokes tobacco regulation,
noting that tobacco companies staved off life-saving regulation of tobacco products by insisting
that scientists supplement the well-understood correlations between tobacco use and lung cancer
with scientific “proof” of causal mechanisms.8 Today’s example is resistance to climate
regulation by skeptics who claim that causation has not yet been established. As Schmalz points
out, science cannot prove causation but can only infer it by ruling out increasingly remote
alternative theoretical hypotheses. This process has no logical end, which means an overly
rigorous insistence on scientific proof would shut down all forms of regulation.
We have no choice but to evaluate the existing studies and make a judgment. While not
everyone has been persuaded by the AST paper,9 there are several facts that are mostly
undisputed. First, there is an incentive—a very large one, from the standpoint of theory, given
that the law blocks off other forms of collusion—for someone to buy up large stakes in
competitors and discourage them from competing with each other. Second, stakes large enough
to give influence have already been obtained by major institutional investors and large activist
investors as well. Third, there is substantial evidence that common ownership has some effect on
the behavior of portfolio firms—with the major discussion about whether this effect is negative
or positive, systemic or sector-specific, large or small.10 Fourth, the spectacular growth of
common ownership over the last few decades has been confronts us with a novel financial
structure that concentrates economic power in a handful of firms, creating, at the least,
significant potential for great harm. This trend will not end anytime soon. Bebchuk and Hirst
predict that the Big Three Index institutional investors will cast 40% of votes at S&P 500 firms
by 2039, up from 25% today.11
Finally, the traditional skeptical view of antitrust law associated with the Chicago school,
whose echoes can be heard in the argument of the critics, is not looking so good these days.
Chicago Schoolists believed that market incentives undermined collusion and monopoly, and
antitrust intervention cannot handle the complexity of market behavior outside obvious cases. In
taking a hammer to the more restrictive antitrust doctrine that prevailed before the 1970s, they
8
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promised that relaxation of antitrust law would not accelerate consolidation. And yet just the
opposite happened.12
All of these developments taken together would normally be considered ample
justification for a policy response—at a minimum, investigation, information-gathering, and
readiness to intervene, but potentially much more.
The Nature of the Mechanism
The mechanism debate addresses the causal pathway that connects common ownership
with higher prices being charged by portfolio firms. The debate initially arose when skeptics
asked why they should believe the AST results when it was possible that the correlations
between ticket prices and common ownership might reflect an innocent omitted variable. But the
debate is important for a second reason. If AST’s empirical results are correct, we need to
understand the mechanism, so that we can design a policy response that is suited to the source of
the anticompetitive outcomes. Various authors, including AST and Elhauge,13 discuss a variety
of possible mechanisms. For simplicity, and at the risk of ignoring important complications and
variations, I will group them into two categories.
Pecuniary incentives. Common shareholders can implement compensation packages that
discourage managers from competing. In the model of Antón and his coauthors (AEGS), the
majority or largest owner offers an incentive contract to each manager of a portfolio firm.14 The
model assumes that management seeks blunt incentives because of its own risk aversion, and that
the compensation package is a compromise between management and the shareholders. As
common owners gain a larger share of a firm, the share of the undiversified owners would
normally decline. That means the undiversified owners have less influence over management,
which can thus implement blunter compensation incentives than the undiversified owners prefer.
One can think of this effect as one of crowding-out: as common ownership expands as a result of
the demand by individuals for diversification, large undiversified owners like activist hedge
funds lose influence.15 Note a twist, however. When a common owner increases in size, the
anticompetitive effect occurs only if the common owner gains relative to large undiversified
shareholders. If large undiversified shareholders also grow, the growth of common ownership
may result in unchanged or lower, not higher, markups. The reason is that in AEGS’ model, the
performance-sensitivity of management compensation depends crucially on the size and
influence of large undiversified shareholders relative to other shareholders. While the empirical
likelihood of this effect may be minimal under current conditions, it is worth keeping in mind.
Career incentives and selection. Common shareholders can also wield their threat to vote
in ways adverse to managers’ interests or (in the case of active managers) to sell their stakes.
With this threat in place, common shareholders can communicate with managers, secretly or in
12
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coded language, directing them to lower output and raise prices. Or common owners can select
or influence the selection of managers based on their propensity to compete. They can also
influence the selection of directors, and use that influence to obtain seats for directors who are
loyal to common owners. Here, again, there is a question of how obviously a common
shareholder would wield this power. Many commentators doubt that a common shareholder
would explicitly instruct managers to collude with the managers of competing firms—a clear
antitrust violation. The response is that common shareholders could direct managers to reduce
output or raise prices, for which there is some anecdotal evidence.16 These instructions do not
violate antitrust law in a clear way; a plaintiff would need to prove that the purpose and effect of
the instructions were to reduce competition. At the same time, a savvy manager is likely to
surmise that a common owner who requests reduction in output may be conveying a similar
message to competitors, and act accordingly.
These two types of mechanisms can be understood in a cross-cutting way in terms of
activity or passivity on the part of the common owner. This distinction gets to the heart of the
skepticism of the critics who doubt that common owners have the incentive to design an optimal
incentive contract that would cause managers to soften competition, especially given the risk that
an incentive contract that discouraged competition by blunting incentives would also discourage
managers from engaging in effort to cut costs and innovate.17 AEGS point out that blunter
incentives both reduce incentives to cut cost and to compete, and from the common owner’s
standpoint, the gain from less competition may exceed the cost from less effort—especially as
the underlying product market becomes more concentrated. Thus, even a relatively passive
common owner—one who more or less deferred to management in all respects, normally voting
with them when they proposed self-interested blunt incentives in their compensation packages—
would produce the common ownership effect of less competition in product markets. But
because managers will tend to propose incentives that are too blunt, common owners may, on the
margin, intervene with more active measures—like threats to fire managers, or attempts to
negotiate compensation packages directly.18
If either of these mechanisms are in play, what is the right policy response? There are a
number of possibilities.
1. Antitrust enforcement. Elhauge argues that firms that have obtained large stakes in
competitors in a concentrated market violate section 7 of the Clayton Act when their acquisitions
have anticompetitive effects.19 The argument is simple and intuitive. If AST is correct, then a
series of acquisitions by the institutional investors reduced competition and increased prices.
Injured private parties—buyers of airline tickets, or others—should bring a case, as should the
government enforcement agencies.

16
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But there are reasons for thinking that traditional antitrust enforcement will not be
adequate to the problem. One is the novelty of the factual setting. Courts have not adjudicated a
claim that a firm has caused anticompetitive harm to a market by gradually acquiring a large
minority ownership stake in multiple competing firms over decades. And while an
anticompetitive purpose is not strictly required, courts may be reluctant to recognize liability on
the part of firms that obtained their large stakes by offering index funds, which are widely
regarded as socially beneficial. The growth of institutional investors, and their possibly
anticompetitive influence on portfolio firms, have the feel of a systemic problem with how
markets work, rather than the kind of one-off antitrust violation that courts are accustomed to
handle.
In 1963, the Supreme Court recognized that courts may block, and break up, mergers that
threatened excessive concentration.20 The logic straightforwardly applies to common ownership,
as Elhauge observes.21 But there is little enthusiasm for this approach among courts today. This
seems to be less about doctrine than the attitudes of judges, who are friendlier to big business
than they used to be. While there may be good cases against hedge funds, private equity firms,
and other activist financial institutions that have clearly bought up large stakes in competing
firms in order to soften competition, creative and ambitious claims against the big institutional
investors whose impact on markets through the largely passive accumulation of shares for
indexing purpose may be a hard sell.
Finally, there are a range of logistical complexities and problems that may deter antitrust
lawsuits. The empirical analysis that litigators would need to undertake in order to prevail is
difficult and expensive; there remain a range of methodological disputes that heighten the risk of
litigation; judges may regard remedies like divestiture as disruptive; and they also may simply
not be able to understand the theory. While, as Elhauge notes, acquisition and even retention of
stock may qualify as an anticompetitive act under blackletter antitrust law,22 I suspect that some
judges will be bothered by the mechanism issue, just like AST’s critics. They may worry that
institutional investors can become liable under the AST theory as a result of actions that they
may not even be aware of (say, the sale of stock to the dispersed market by a large undiversified
shareholder23). They will not believe that institutional investors order portfolio firms to soften
competition unless there is proof of communications; they may not regard voting for a
management compensation package that provides management with incentives that are more
blunt than socially optimal as sufficiently clear; and they will likely regard the AEGS crowdingout mechanism as a problem for the legislature rather than the courts.
AEGS suggests that the ultimate problem for competition is not so much the rise of
common ownership as the decline of the large undiversified investor. In AEGS’s model,
competition is retarded even in a Berle-Means word of dispersed shareholders if large blocks are
not held by undiversified owners. That seems more like a regulation-of-capital-markets problem
20
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than a problem for which traditional antitrust legal principles are suited. And a regulatory
approach may seem more appropriate because courts might worry that if they recognize antitrust
liability in one case, thereafter potential defendants will not know whether a range of possibly
reasonable measures—like mirror-voting, or transferring voting authority from fund families to
funds, or limiting their acquisitions to a relatively small percentage of a firm’s stock—will
suffice to avoid liability. To be sure, creative and ambitious courts may rule otherwise, but in the
meantime these risks seem likely to deter litigation, and certainly large-scale litigation that would
provide optimal incentives to minimize the common ownership effect where harmful.
2. Regulation of corporate governance. A paradox lurks in the problem of common
ownership. Common owners have a fiduciary duty to exert pressure on managers so that they act
in the interest of clients. But to fulfill this duty, common owners need a means of control. And if
they have a means of control, they may use it to reduce competition, indeed, in the service of
their clients.
We can cut the Gordian knot with a regulatory approach that forbids large common
owners to communicate with, or exert control over, managers in any way. The rule would
provide that only undiversified owners may communicate with managers. Common owners must
remain mum and either not vote or mirror-vote. The effect of this rule would be to create a kind
of dual-class ownership structure. Undiversified shareholders would retain voting and
communication rights; diversified shareholders would be passive, protected only by their right to
dividends and liquidation value.
One virtue of this approach is that it is consistent with one of the original stated
justifications of index investing: to minimize expenses. Index funds distinguished themselves
from active funds in just this way: because they did not pick stocks, they could refrain from
monitoring firms, and of course knowing nothing about the firms, they had little reason to vote.
Unfortunately, this justification was in tension with their fiduciary duty to their clients. The
reform would require redefinition of the fiduciary duty as requiring the common owner to
advance the interests of clients in an administrative capacity only.
A problem with this approach is that it casts its net too large, depriving diversified
owners of their control rights even if they are too small to reduce competition. In aggregate, this
might leave shareholders to the mercy of managers who do not have to face adverse votes from
the bulk of their shareholders. Moreover, in the AEGS model a common owner may push
management of a portfolio firm to compete more rather than less vigorously. If the company has
a large undiversified shareholder, AEGS predicts that the common owner will push management
to compete less vigorously. But if the company has no large undiversified shareholder and only
small shareholders, then the common owner could push management to compete more
vigorously. Blocking communication by common owners may on net be unwise.
There are other possible corporate governance reforms, for example, strengthened
enforcement of restrictions on interlocking directorates, as it appears that common owners place
directors on the boards of competing firms, and may exercise influence through those directors.24
However, this reform would leave numerous other pathways of influence.
24
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3. Regulation of Compensation of Management of Portfolio Firms. One can also
imagine a more aggressive approach to corporate governance that regulates management
compensation. AEGS finds that common ownership leads to suboptimal (from a social
perspective) performance-insensitive management compensation, which in turns results in less
competition and higher prices. The natural regulatory response would be to require a higher
degree of performance-sensitivity in management contracts. Imagine a law that provides that
when common ownership of a firm exceeds a threshold, the compensation plan must be reviewed
by the SEC. The SEC would have no authority to reject the plan based on the magnitude of
compensation (which is the normal focus of complaints about inadequate corporate governance).
But it would be permitted to reject the plan if it is insufficiently performance-sensitive.
The standard for judging performance-sensitivity would be based on the compensation
practices of firms in other sectors that are more competitive (either because common ownership
is less or the product market contains more firms) or firms in the same sector that do not have
significant common owners. While government regulation of the terms of employment
agreements is generally frowned upon, it may well be justified in this context. It could be
modeled on actions against investment advisors for excessive fees under section 36(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, which regulates compensation of investment advisors for
managing investment funds.
4. Regulation of market structure. A more radical regulatory approach is to limit the size
of common shareholders. Imagine that a common shareholder would not be permitted to own
more than a small share (say, 1%) of competing firms in a concentrated market; alternatively, a
common shareholder could own as large a share of a firm as it wants as long as it owns no shares
in its competitors. On this approach, the institutional investor market would presumably
segment. There would be behemoths that own, say, 10-20% of one airline, one oil company, one
automobile company, and so on; and there would be minnows that own 1% of all airlines, all oil
companies, all automobile companies, etc. Other investors, some active and others passive, may
own more or less large stakes and more or less diversified holdings. Individuals seeking their
optimal risk-return tradeoff would face a more complex set of options than they do today, but
most people would be adequately served by either a behemoth (they give up a small amount of
diversification in return for simplicity) or a minnow (they obtain maximum diversification but
have to wade through multiple options) or a combination (they obtain optimal diversification but
must transact with multiple suppliers).
The advantage of this approach is that it is unlikely that diversification exhibits the scale
economies that, say, a complex manufacturing operation does. The stock prices of firms within a
single sector are highly correlated. The diversification gains from owning all airlines rather than
one are small. And because individuals would remain free to buy shares in the minnows, or to
buy shares in multiple large funds, those who insisted on maximum diversification would remain
free to obtain it at low cost through some trouble.
In an earlier paper, I and my coauthors argued that institutional investors should be given
a choice between one option or the other—the minnow approach of complete diversification, or
the behemoth approach where they sacrifice some diversification but can be as large as they
8
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want.25 (They would also be permitted to be a fully diversified behemoth—with large shares in
even competing firms—if they commit not to exert influence by word or vote, as in #3 above.)
This regulatory approach would be a lot simpler than incremental remediation through litigation
under the antitrust laws. Which is not to say that the regulatory approach would be simple.
Regulators would have to define markets, and figure out how to address cases where a single
firm operates in multiple overlapping markets.
Moreover, market structure regulation is not as simple as converting behemoths into
minnows. To take an extreme case, if 99 common owners each owns a 1% stake in every firm in
a sector, and (as in AEGS) they do nothing while managers have the remaining stake (or some
combination of managers and undiversified funds), the common ownership effect will remain:
executive compensation will be insufficiently performance-insensitive, so the firms will be both
poorly run and uncompetitive. Market structure regulation must ensure that undiversified
shareholders retain a sizeable chunk of every firm. The rule allowing common owners to own
stakes larger than 1% if they own no more than one firm in a sector would spur some
institutional investors to become large owners that are undiversified within a sector; but it might
not suffice.26
If we take the AEGS model as our guide, then policy should be oriented to ensuring that
all firms have large undiversified shareholders. It is unclear what the right policy instrument for
such a goal would be, but presumably a literal or effective Pigouvian tax on (within-sector)
diversification and (in general) smallness could be appropriate. On the other hand, we might
worry that extremely large common owners would collude with each other or engage in
parallelism, and if this is a case then the expansion of common ownership as such should be the
focus of policy.
5. Stricter Antitrust Enforcement of Portfolio Firms. Theory and evidence say that
common ownership’s effect on the competition of underlying portfolio firms is in part a function
of the competitiveness of the markets in which those firms operate.27 If you hold constant the
degree of common ownership of the airline industry, and add more airlines, ticket prices should
decline. This suggests that an alternative or (more likely) supplemental policy instrument for
addressing common ownership is greater antitrust enforcement (or regulation) of the underlying
markets. A simple approach would be to lower the HHI thresholds in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, so that fewer mergers occur and industries remain more competitive. Courts and
antitrust agencies could also pay greater attention to efforts by common owners to orchestrate
cooperative arrangements among competing portfolio firms. Where common owners call
meetings between such firms, offer general directions to them, and so on,28 the existence of a
common owner with large stakes in the competing firms could be a “plus factor” for purposes of
section 1 analysis where collusion can be inferred in the absence of a documented agreement.

25

Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, and E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of
Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2017).
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This approach recognizes that the existing Merger Guidelines disregard a negative
externality from mergers—that the incremental concentration of the market caused by a merger
will increase the attractiveness of stakes in the firms in the industry for common owners, giving
them an incentive to acquire stakes or increase their stakes, and then use their power to further
limit competition between the merged firm and its remaining competitors. Or, to put the point
differently: we should be willing to give up some scale economies in order to reduce the risk that
competition will be excessively reduced in the future through the instrument of common
ownership. Merger review currently recognizes that partial acquisitions (that is, where one firm
obtains a minority stake in its competitors) can reduce competition;29 this logic extends
straightforwardly to cases where a third-party investor has partial stakes in the two competing
firms.
The problem here is that U.S. product markets are already highly concentrated; it may be
too late for an aggressive merger policy to make much of a different, at least in the short to
medium term. And if economies of scale in the product favor large firms, then a more aggressive
merger policy may on net cause harm.
The Indirect Costs of Intervention
Several articles written after AST identify a possible benefit of common ownership aside
from its facilitation of diversification: common owners may compel portfolio firms to cooperate
in socially beneficial ways. We can identify two versions of this argument. First, imagine that
Firm A and Firm B are independently developing COVID-19 vaccines. Each firm has proprietary
information that it refuses to share with its competitor. A common owner is indifferent as to
whether Firm A or B wins the race, and so directs the two firms to share or disclose their trade
secrets. Here, the common owner enables each firm to capture positive externalities from the
behavior of other firms.30
Second, imagine now that Firm A and Firm B belong to different sectors. Firm A emits
greenhouse gases or some other pollutant, and those emissions harm Firm B. A common owner
of Firm A and Firm B will direct Firm A to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions. Of course, the
common owner will not direct socially optimal emissions but it will still benefit society.31
If either of these hypotheses is true, then restrictions on common ownership may be
socially harmful.
From both an antitrust and regulatory perspective, however, there is less to these
arguments than meet the eye. In antitrust cases, defendants can often argue that a business
efficiency justifies behavior that would otherwise seem anticompetitive. Indeed, the researchsharing justification is not much different from the argument that common owners benefit their
clients by giving them access to easy diversification. If research efficiencies arise, then in
suitable cases defendants may argue that common ownership (as well as mergers and other forms
of cooperation) may be lawful.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 13 (2010).
Antón et al., Innovation, supra note 6.
31
Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2020).
29
30
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The same point can be made about regulation. Simple regulations designed to limit
common ownership or control by common owners of portfolio forms may (as so often happens)
be required to yield to a more complex approach that creates safe harbors for socially beneficial
cooperation across firms. Antitrust law, and related regulations that encourage competition, are
already full of such exceptions.
Finally, regulators should be careful to distinguish diversification that involves common
ownership within industries and diversification that involves common ownership (only) across
industries. In the second example, a regulation that limits common ownership within sectors will
still preserve at least a portion of the socially beneficial behavior: the common owner will restrict
greenhouse gases in order to benefit the firms it owns outside the sector of the polluter, while it
will have no incentive to reduce competition because it owns only one firm per sector. The first
example is more difficult. A regulation that limits the common owner’s ability to own multiple
firms in one sector will also prevent it from capturing the externality.
Conclusion
The debate about common ownership echoes the old debate about management
incentives in the Berle-Means firm. When shareholders are dispersed, management can choose
blunt incentives because no one monitors it. When common shareholders predominate,
management can choose blunt incentives because the common owners benefit from them. True,
in the AEGS model, common ownership produces a better outcome than dispersed ownership
because the common owner cares more about corporate outcomes than dispersed shareholders
do, and will push for some performance-sensitivity in order to induce managers to cut costs. But
the outcome is far from optimal. And it may be worse. With today’s high product market
concentration, blunt management incentives imply not just traditional low effort (failure to cut
costs and innovate), but also anticompetitive outcomes. The blunt incentives preferred by
managers will lead them to compete less as well as innovate less, and that matters more when the
market is concentrated than when many firms exist.
The biggest common owners also have achieved a level of financial power not seen since
the Gilded Age, raising questions about whether they may use that power to achieve political
ends or to collude with each other. These risks are independent of the common ownership effect
studied by AST, and remain empirically unstudied,32 but are just as significant. As the firms
continue their inexorable rise in power and influence, we can expect that, like the tech industry
before it, their currently benign reputation will give way to public uneasiness and, sooner or
later, a government crackdown.

32

A recent study of investors finds that they exert political influence through portfolio firms, possibly in violation of
campaign finance laws, though the large institutional investors are not the main culprits. Mariane Bertrand, Matilde
Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, Franceso Trebbi, and Eyub Yegen, Investing in Influence: Investors, Portfolio
Firms, and Political Giving (Oct. 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
http://sites.bu.edu/fisman/files/2020/10/Investing_in_influence_7Oct2020.pdf.
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